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ARGUMENT
The prior decision of the Supreme Court in this matter
appears to be based primarily upon its holding that, under Utah
law as it existed at the time of Burtons' execution upon the
property, a creditor was not allowed to disregard an alleged
fraudulent conveyance and execute directly upon property in the
hands of an alleged fraudulent transferee, but must first bring

an action to set aside the alleged fraudulent conveyance prior to
conducting an execution upon the property.^
Burtons respectfully submit that this holding is directly
contrary to the language of the controlling provision of the Utah
Fraudulent Conveyances Act, UCA Section 25-1-15

(1953)

(repealed

19 88) which stated:
UCA 25-1-15
Rights of creditors with matured claims.
Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a
creditor, such creditor, when his claim has matured,
may, as against any person, except a purchaser for fair
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the
time of the purchase or one who has derived title
immediately or mediately from such a purchaser:
(1) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation
annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his claims;
or
(2) Disregard the conveyance, and attach, or levy
execution upon, the property conveyed.
A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent
has given less than a fair consideration for the
conveyance or obligation may retain the property or
obligation as security for repayment.
(Emphasis
added.)
Under this statute, creditors were expressly given the
option of either bringing an action to set aside the fraudulent
conveyance, or of disregarding
directly upon the property.

the conveyance and

executing

The Court's decision in this case

renders Section 25-1-15(2) a nullity.
true and correct copy of the Court's Decision, dated
February 19, 1993, is attached as an addendum hereto.

- 2 -

The Court addressed Section 25-1-15(2) on page 9 of its
decision, wherein the Court held, in essence, that the remedy
provided by Section 25-1-15(2) is not available until after the
creditor has brought an action to set aside the conveyance.
However, this argument overlooks the relationship between Section
25-1-15(1) and 25-1-15(2).

Moreover, requiring a creditor to

first bring an action to set aside the conveyance overlooks the
express language of Section 25-1-15(2) which allows a creditor to
"disregard the conveyance."
Burton's construction of Section 25-1-15(2) is supported by
the Supreme Court's decision in Jensen v. Eames, 519 P.2d 236
(Utah

1974) .

In Jensen, a judgment

creditor

served a

post-judgment writ of garnishment upon a third party, to whom the
judgment debtor had allegedly fraudulently conveyed certain
shares of stock.

Within the garnishment proceeding, the creditor

moved to have the sale of stock set aside as a fraudulent
conveyance.

The trial court denied the motion on the grounds

that such action could not be taken in a garnishment proceeding
and that the creditor must file a separate action.

The Supreme

Court reversed the decision of the trial court on this issue,
holding at page 42 8:
A judgment creditor may litigate the question of a
fraudulent conveyance in a garnishment proceedings, in
a creditor's bill in equity, or in an execution
proceeding, provided that once contested the burden is
upon the one alleging the fraudulent conveyance to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
transfer was in fact fraudulent. (Emphasis added.)
- 3 -

Although Jensen

is

factually

distinguishable

from

p r e s e n t case, Jensen i s c o n s i s t e n t with Burtons 1 p o s i t i o n
under S e c t i o n 2 5 - 1 - 1 5 ( 2 ) ,

the
that,

a c r e d i t o r may seek a post-judgment

remedy a g a i n s t a l l e g e d f r a u d u l e n t l y

conveyed p r o p e r t y i n

the

hands of a t r a n s f e r e e without f i r s t b r i n g i n g an a c t i o n t o s e t
a s i d e the conveyance.
The only a u t h o r i t y c i t e d in support of the C o u r t ' s holding
t h a t a c r e d i t o r must f i r s t

b r i n g an a c t i o n

to set

aside

a

fraudulent conveyance i s Butler v . Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah
1987), which s t a t e s a t page 1262s
Act

for

a fraudulent

conveyance."

However,

"The remedy provided by t h e

conveyance

is

the voiding

of

there is nothing within Butler

the
which

suggests t h a t the voiding of a fraudulent conveyance can only be
achieved through a s p e c i f i c a c t i o n t o s e t aside the conveyance.
That issue was not before the Court in B u t l e r .
Burtons'

c o n s t r u c t i o n of

s u p p o r t e d by UCA S e c t i o n

Section 25-1-15(2)

25-1-8,

which d e c l a r e d

conveyances made with i n t e n t t o defraud conveyances
v o i d , " and by a l l

of

t h e p r i o r Utah f r a u d u l e n t

d e c i s i o n s , which uniformly held t h a t fraudulent
"void."

is

further
that

all

"shall

be

conveyances

conveyance

are

Some of t h e s e c a s e s went so far as to d e s c r i b e such

conveyances

as

"void

in

toto,"

W.P. Noble

Mercantile

Co. v . Mt. Pleasant Equitable Co-op I n s t . , 42 P. 86*9 (Utah 1894)
and "as i f

t h e t r a n s a c t i o n n e v e r took p l a c e a t a l l . "

Meyer

v . General American Corporation, 569 P.2d 1094, 1098 (Utah 1977);

Cardon v. Harper, 151 P.2d 99, 102 (Utah 1944).

Prior to the

present case, no Utah Supreme Court decision suggested that such
conveyances are merely

"voidable" rather

than

notwithstanding the express language of Section 25-1-8.

"void,"
Even if

this is a reasonable construction of Section 25-1-8, Section
25-1-15(2) expressly allows creditors to "disregard

the

conveyance" and execute upon property which is in the hands of an
alleged fraudulent transferee.
The Court further states on page 9 of its decision that,
even if Section 25-1-15(2) allows a creditor to execute directly
upon property in the hands of a fraudulent transferee, such a
remedy was not available against Baldwin because Baldwin was not
Willard Woods 1 immediate successors in interest.

However,

Section 25-1-15 addresses

alleged

situations

in which

fraudulently conveyed property has passed through the hands of
multiple transferees, and exempts only bona fide purchasers and
those who purchase "immediately or mediately" from bona fide
purchasers.

Although Baldwin may have been exempt from execution

if she was a bona fide purchaser, the statute clearly applies to
remote transferees who are not bona fide purchasers.

The Court's

decision erroneously limits Section 25-1-15(2) to immediate
transferees in all instances.
The most important point which Burtons wish to make in this
Petition is that, even if -they were ultimately incorrect in their
interpretation of Section 25-1-15(2), Section 25-1-8 and the Utah
- 5 -

cases which uniformly described fraudulent conveyances as "void,"
Burtons' actions were based upon a good faith interpretation of
these authorities.

A literal reading of Section 25-1-15(2)

certainly appears to allow Burtons to act as they did.

Burtons

should not be subjected to an award of attorneys fees for having
acted in bad faith where their conduct was consistent with a
reasonable interpretation of the relevant legal authorities.
The Court held on pages 13-17 of its opinion that Burtons
are liable for attorney's fees under UCA Section 78-27-56(1).
Section 78-27-56(1) provides that attorney's fees may be awarded
against a party which asserts an action or defense which is
"without merit" and which is "lacking in good faith."

The

"without merit" element of Section 78-27-56(1) requires that the
subject action or defense be "frivolous" or "having no basis in
law or fact."
The

Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 19830.

"lacking in good faith" element of Section 78-27-56(1)

requires the absence of one or more of the following:

"(1) An

honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2)
no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; (3) no
intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the activities in
question will hinder, delay or defraud others."

Id. at 151. The

existence of bad faith is a subjective question of state of
mind.

Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah

1989) .

- 6 -

Burtons submit that their conduct in this case does not fall
within either elements of Section 78-27-56 (1) .

As previously

stated, Burtons acted in accordance with their apparent rights
under UCA Section 25-1-15(2), 25-1-8 and relevant Utah case law.
In holding that void in fact means "voidable," the Court relied
wholly upon authorities from outside the State of Utah, which
Burtons could not have foreseen.

Moreover, the Court's holding

that a creditor must bring a separate action to set aside a
fraudulent conveyance before executing upon alleged fraudulently
conveyed property overlooks the relationship between UCA Section
25-1-15(1) and (2).
Even

if Burtons

are ultimately

incorrect

in their

interpretation of Section 25-1-15, this does not mean in itself
that Burtons' legal position was "without merit."

As this Court

stated in regard to URCP 11 in Barnard v. Sutliff, 202 Utah
Adv. Rep. 17, 20 (Utah 1992):
Nor does rule 11 require the attorney to reach the
correct legal position from the research. It is enough
that the attorney's reading of the law is a reasonable
one. Thus, once an attorney forms a reasonable opinion
after conducting appropriate research, the mere fact
that the attorney's view of the law was wrong cannot
support a finding of a rule 11 violation.
Burtons' interpretation of Section 25-1-15 is at least
tenable, and was not directly contrary to any controlling Utah
authority.

Therefore, Burtons' position should not be declared

to be "without merit."

- 7 -

Regarding

the "lack of good faith" element, there is

absolutely no evidence in the record that Burtons did not
honestly believe in their legal position, or that they acted out
of any improper motive.

The Court's decision of this point,

which appears upon page 17 of the decision, was bas€>d solely upon
the fact that Burtons issued a praecipe directing the Sheriff to
levy upon the "right, title and interest" of Baldwins as
"successors in interest to Willard D. Wood."

The Court held that

"Baldwins were not successors of Willard Wood" and n[H]ad Burtons
proceeded with an honest belief in the propriety of

their

activities, they would have sought first to have the Wood-to-Wood
conveyance set aside as fraudulent before attempting

to

wrongfully execute on Baldwin's interest in the property."
This analysis subsumes the previous issue regarding the
reasonableness of Burtons' legal position.

If Burtons honestly

believed that they were entitled to execute upon the property
under UCA Section 25-1-15, then none of the conduct cited in the
Court's analysis constitutes a lack of good faith.

There is

absolutely no evidence in the record which suggests that Baldwins
did not honestly believe in their asserted legal position or
acted out of improper motives.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Burtons request in the alternative:

(1)

for a reversal of the Court's prior decision and entry of
judgment in favor of Burtons; (2) for a remand of this case to
- 8 -

the trial court for trial upon the issue of whether Baldwin was a
bona fide purchaser? and (3) for a reversal of the trial court's
award of attorney's fees against Burtons, due to Burtons1
reasonable and good faith belief that their execution upon the
property was in accordance with Utah law.
DATED this

S

day of March, 1993.
PERKINS,^SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN

DAVID H.
Attorney for Defendants/
Appellants Burton

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Paul H. Richins, 68 South Main, 8th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101 this

^

day of March, 1993.

David H. Schwobe
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This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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HALL, Chief Justice;
Defendants Max D. Burton, Sr. , Emily A- Burton, and
Max D. Burton, Jr., appeal from a summary judgment entered in
favor of plaintiff Lynda C. Baldwin. We affirm.
In considering an appeal from summary judgment, we view
the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.1 We
recite the facts accordingly.
On December 19, 1979, Ralph L. and Elaine L. Kofoed
executed a warranty deed in favor of Willard D. Wood and Tonya

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634,
636 (Utah 1989).
AnncMniiw

Glazier Wood*, thereby conveying the
property in question* The deed was
1979. On May 1, 1980, Willard Wood
the same property in favor of Tonya
on May 28, 1980c

Kofoeds' interest in the
recorded on December 19,
executed a warranty deed to
Wood, That deed was recorded

On June 9, 1981, Max Do Burton, Sr e , and Emily A.
Burton obtained a judgment against Willard Wood and another
person in an action brought to recover money due from a prior
transaction-2
On September 30, 1981, Tonya Wood executed a trust deed
in favor of the Kofoeds as trustor and beneficiary in
consideration of the Kofoeds' remaining equity in the property.
That deed was signed by both Tonya and Willard Wood and was
recorded on October 2, 1981. On that same date, Tonya Wood
conveyed the property by warranty deed to Gregory and Lynda
Baldwin. That deed, signed by both Tonya and Willard Wood, was
also recorded on October 2, 1981. The Baldwins therefore took
the property subject to the underlying mortgage, the Kofoeds7
trust deed, and any liens of record. At the time of the
conveyance to the Baldwins, Tonya Wood was the only record owner
of the property in question, and there were no liens of record
against her.
On December 21, 1982, Gregory Baldwin quitclaimed his
interest in the property to Lynda Baldwin/ That deed was
recorded on December 31, 1982.
On April 21, 1983, the Woods filed a petition for
voluntary bankruptcy. The Burtons were listed as creditors of
Willard Wood in the bankruptcy proceeding. The Woods' debts were
discharged in bankruptcy in December 1983.
The property in question was scheduled for foreclosure
in September 198 6 under the Kofoeds' trust deed. The foreclosure
report prepared by Surety Title Company indicated that the Burton
judgment lien against Willard Wood had attached to the property,
owned by Lynda Baldwin at the time, behind the first mortgage of

2

Prior to 1980, Max Burton, Sr., Willard Wood, and
Clealon B. Mann were partners in Woodcove Subdivision. In 1980,
Wood and Mann agreed to purchase Burton's interest in the
project. Wood and Mann executed a promissory note in favor of
Max Burton, Sr., and Emily Burton in the amount of $35,000. On
February 25, 1981, the Burtons brought suit against Wood and Mann
to recover the balance due under the promissory note. Summary
judgment was entered in favor of the Burtons in the amount of
$38,500. Sometime during September 1986, Max Burton, Sr.,
assigned his interest in the judgment against Wood to Max Burton,
Jr.
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Equitable Life Assurance Company and ahead of the September 30,
1981 trust deed from Tonya Wood to the Kofoeds.
On August 6, 198 6, the Burtons obtained a writ of
execution authorizing the Salt Lake County Sheriff to Levy upon
and sell enough of Willard Wood's unexempt property to satisfy
the Burtons' judgment against him. About the same time, the
Burtons delivered a praecipe directing the sheriff to "levy on
the right, title and interest of Gregory Baldwin and Lynda
Baldwin, successors in interest to Willard D. Wood*" 3
On August 11, 1986, the sheriff's office issued a
notice of real estate levy. Under that notice, the sheriff
levied upon all the "right, title, claim and interest of Gregory
Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, successors in interest to Willard D«
Wood." The notice of real estate levy was recorded on August 12,
1986. The sheriff's office also issued a notice of real estate
sale, indicating that all "right, title and interest of Gregory
Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, successors in interest to Willard D.
Wood," were to be sold on September 9, 1986. On August 15, 1986,
the sheriff published notice of the real estate sale of the
Baldwins' interest in the property.
On September 9, 1986, the sheriff conducted an
execution sale whereby the property was sold to the Burtons for
$8,760. A certificate of sale-execution was subsequently issued
indicating that all "right, title and interest of Gregory Baldwin
and Lynda Baldwin, successors in interest of Willard D. Wood,"
had been sold to satisfy the judgment the Burtons had against
Willard Wood. On May 7, 1987, the sheriff's office conveyed the
Baldwins' interest in the property to the Burtons.
On June 10, 1987, at the foreclosure under the Kofoed
trust deed, the property was sold at a trustee's sale to
Robert L. Rice. Rice received a trustee's deed, which was
recorded on June 18, 1987. On that same date, Rice executed a
warranty deed for the property in favor of Derald A. Twilley.
The warranty deed was also recorded on June 18, 1987. Twilley
then conveyed the property by quitclaim deed to Lynda Baldwin.
The quitclaim deed was recorded on October 8, 1987. Lynda
Baldwin subsequently conveyed the property by quitclaim deed to
the Lynda C. Baldwin Trust. That deed was recorded on June 23,
1988.
On behalf of the Lynda C. Baldwin Trust, Lynda Baldwin
commenced this action against the Burtons to set aside the
3

While the original writ of execution directed the sheriff
to levy upon and sell unexempt real property of Willard Wood
only, in every subsequent document, the Burtons also included
"Gregory Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, as successors in interest of
Willard D. Wood."
3
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sheriff's deed on the basis that execution on the property was
improper because Willard Wood, the Burtons' judgment* debtor, had
no interest in the property at the time the Burtons' judgment was
docketed. Additionally, Baldwin sought to quiet title in the
property and to have the trial court declare that the conveyance
from Willard Wood to his wife was valid as to the Baldwins and
that the Baldwins took the property from Tonya Wood as bona fide
purchasersc
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial
court granted Baldwin's motion, denied the Burtons' motion, and
declared void both the sheriff's sale at which the property was
sold to the Burtons and the sheriff's deed conveying the
property. The trial court also found that when Max Burton, Sr.,
obtained his judgment against Willard Wood, Wood had no interest
in the property to which a judgment lien could attache The trial
court held that it was necessary for the Burtons to bring a
separate action to set aside the allegedly fraudulent conveyance
and that the statute of limitations for that action had run. In
a subsequent order, the trial court awarded Baldwin $7,872.66 for
attorney fees and related damages„ The Burtons appeal from these
rulings.
The primary issues presented on appeal are whether
(1) a separate, prior action must be filed to set aside a
fraudulent conveyance in a suit to foreclose and execute on a
lien; (2) the statute of limitations bars an action by the
Burtons to set aside the fraudulent conveyance; (3) the Baldwins
were bona fide purchasers when they took the property from Tonya
Wood; and (4) the trial court's award of attorney fees was
reasonable.
We begin by noting the applicable standard of review.
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. 4 When reviewing an order granting summary
judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion. 5 The legal conclusions of the trial court

4

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort,
808 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1991); Utah State Coalition of Senior
Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Co., 776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah
1989) .
5

Culp Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 650, 651
(Utah 1990) .
No. 900339
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are not accorded deference, but are reviewed instead for
correctness,6
SEPARATE ACTION FOR FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
The Burtons contend that before foreclosing and
executing on a lien, it is not necessary to file a separate
action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. They base their
argument on two points: First, they contend that the conveyance
from Willard Wood to his wife was fraudulent because he was
attempting to protect the property from creditors. The Burtons
claim that because the conveyance was fraudulent, it was
therefore void and Willard Wood still maintained an interest in
the property* Because Wood maintained an interest in the
property, the lien could attach, and it was therefore proper to
execute on the property without having the conveyance set aside
as fraudulent. In the alternative, the Burtons argue that
because the conveyance was fraudulent, the Burtons could entirely
disregard it and execute upon the property.
The Burtons maintain that according to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-22-1,7 the judgment obtained against Willard Wood in 1981
attached as a lien to the property. At issue is whether Willard
Wood, the judgment debtor, had an interest in the property in
question at the time the Burtons obtained their judgment against
him. In order to make this determination, we must address the
question of whether the 1980 conveyance from Willard Wood to his
wife was void or simply voidable.
The Burtons assert that the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances
Act ("the Act") explicitly states that a fraudulent conveyance is
void. To support this position, they rely on section 25-1-8 of
the Act,8 which provides:
Every conveyance or assignment, in
writing or otherwise, of any estate or
interest in lands, or in goods or things in
6

Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irr. Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171
(Utah 1991); Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129
(Utah 1990).
7

Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 states, "From the time the
judgment of the district court or circuit court is docketed . . .
it becomes a lien upon all the real property of the judgment
debtor . . . ."
8

Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-1 to -16 (1953) (repealed
19 88) with Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 25-6-1 to -13 (1988). Because the conveyance in question took
place in 1980, the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act was still in
effect and therefore governs this case.
5
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action, or of rents or profits issuing
therefrom, and-every -charge upon lands, goods
or things in action or upon the rents or
profits thereof, made with the intent to
delay, hinder or defraud creditors, or other
persons, of their lawful suits, damages,
forfeitures, debts or demands, and every bond
or other evidence of debt given, suits
commenced, or decree or judgment suffered,
with the like intent, as against the person
hindered, delayed or defrauded shall be
void*9
Section 25-1-8 does invalidate conveyances made with
intent to defraud. However, such conveyances are not
automatically void. Under well-established law, a number of
cases have held "void" to mean "voidable" only. ° Professor
Williston, in his work on contracts, stated:
[A] statute may and sometimes does make a
bargain absolutely void, but even though a
statute states it in terms, "void" has been
held to mean "voidable." . • *

Unless no other conclusion is possible
from the words of a statute it should not be
held to make agreements contravening it
totally void.11
In Wagner v. United States,12 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an assignment under
Indiana law, although not in compliance with a statute, was
voidable, not void. The Wagner court stated, "[E]ven when [an
assignment] is statutorily described as being %void,' the proper
construction is that the action is *voidable at the option of one

9

Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-8 (1953) (repealed 1988) (emphasis

added).
10

See Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 79, 84-85 (1851)
(qualifications of general rule); Ewe11 v. Daggs, 108 U.S. 143,
149 (1882); Fisher v. Thumlert, 76 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Wash. 1938).
11

14 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts
§ 1630A (3d ed. 1972) (citations omitted).
12

573 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1978).
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of the parties or some one [sic] legally interested
therein. ' ,|13 Wacrner stated the general rule of construction
that when an act is void as to persons who have an interest in
impeachina it, the act is not utterly void, but merely
voidable. I4
Utah cases adhere to the general rule expressed above.
This court has stated that "a contract induced by fraud, false
representations, mistake, etc., is not void but only voidable,
and it is entirely within the right of the injured party to
affirm it or treat it as valid and subsisting."15 This court
has also specifically addressed section 25-1-8 of the Act. 1 6
With regard to that section, we stated, "The remedy provided by
the Act for a fraudulent conveyance is the voiding of the
conveyance." 17 These cases clearly show that some action must
be taken by the complaining party to render a conveyance void.
Two cases from other jurisdictions with facts similar
to this appeal specifically address the issue of "void" versus
"voidable." In Becker v. Becker, 18 a creditor brought suit to
set aside a transfer made by the debtor to himself and his wife.
The creditor claimed that the transfer was made fraudulently to
hinder the plaintiff's ability to recover on the defendant's debt
owed to her. While the threshold issue in Becker was whether the
transfer itself was fraudulent, the Becker court also stated:
"A voluntary or a fraudulent conveyance is
valid between the parties, and in fact as to
the whole world, except those within the
protection of the statute; thus the words
*null' and ^void' are construed to mean
voidable only. Therefore such conveyances
vest the legal title in the grantee, subject

13

Wagner, 573 F.2d at 451-52 (quoting Doney v. Lauqhlin, 94
N.E. 1027, 1028 (Ind. 1911)).
14

Wagner, 573 F.2d at 452 (citing Mutual Benefit Life Ins.
Co. v. Winne, 49 P. 446, 449 (Mont. 1897) (discussing general
rule of construction for "void" and "voidable")).
15

Frailev v. McGarrv, 211 P.2d 840, 845 (Utah 1949).

16

See Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987).

17

Idi at 1262.

18

416 A.2d 156 (Vt. 1980).
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only to be divested by the creditors of the
grantor if they choose to impeach it.1'19
In Gurley v. Blue Rents, Inc.,20 a creditor brought
suit to set aside an allegedly fraudulent conveyance wherein a
debtor husband conveyed to his wife his interest in real estate
held by the two as joint tenants. Pertinent to the issue now
before this court, Gurley concluded that as to the grantor's
creditors, "the conveyance is voidable [as opposed to void] an$
may be set aside at their option."21
The Burtons rely on a line of cases from this court to
support their claim that the conveyance at issue is void.22
These cases are easily distinguishable because they involved
either a prior proceeding where a conveyance was adjudged
fraudulent and void or a situation where a motion to declare a
conveyance fraudulent had been denied.23 Therefore, in all of
those cases, one of the issues was whether the conveyance was
actually fraudulent. In the instant case, the conveyance has hot
been declared fraudulent or void. Furthermore, whether the
conveyance was fraudulent is not an issue before this court.
Hence, although section 25-1-8 of the Act uses the
language "void," as opposed to voidable, we do not believe that
such a strict interpretation is warranted by the applicable case
law. The conveyance is not the type of act that is routinely
null, but rather, it must be challenged or set aside to render it
void. Moreover, the conveyance is not something of which all the
world may take advantage, but only the Burtons, who claim that
13

Id. at 162 (quoting Jones v. Williams, 109 A. 803, 807
(Vt. 1920)).
20

383 So. 2d 531 (Ala. 1980).

21

Id. at 536 (citing Brown v. Andrews, 257 So. 2d 356, 3^9
(Ala- 1972)); see also First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham v. Love,
167 So. 703 (Ala. 1936).
22

See Meyer v. General American Corp. , 569 P. 2d 1094 (Utc^h
1977); Jensen v. Eames, 519 P.2d 236 (Utah 1974); Cardon v.
Harper, 151 P.2d 99 (Utah 1944); W.P. Noble Mercantile Co. v. iflt.
Pleasant Equitable Co-Operative Inst., 42 P. 869 (Utah 1894).
23

Meyer, 569 P.2d at 1095 (trial court held sale void fori
failure of fair consideration and lack of good faith); Jensen,
519 P.2d at 237 (plaintiff urged trial court to find transfer of
stock fraudulent conveyance under Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-1 to
-16); Cardon, 151 P.2d at 100 (appeal from decree adjudging
conveyance of land fraudulent); W.P. Noble Mercantile Co., 42 p.
at 870 (plaintiff sought to declare assignment of real estate
null and void).
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tney were injured by the transfer. Because the conveyance from
Willard Wood to his wife has not been adjudged void as a
fraudulent conveyance, we conclude that it is voidable but not
void.
We next address the Burtons' argument that because the
conveyance was fraudulent, the Burtons could, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 25-1-15, entirely disregard it and execute upon the
property.2* Again, the Burtons claim that the conveyance was
fraudulent because Willard Wood was attempting to shield the
property from his creditors. While there is some record evidence
suggesting that Willard Wood conveyed the property to his wife to
protect it from creditors, we find little merit in this argument.
A transfer must first be held void as fraudulent before section
25-1-15 becomes operative.25 Although it remains in dispute,
even if Willard Wood did admit fraud, the conveyance has not yet
been adjudged fraudulent, and therefore, the remedy under section
25-1-15 is not available.
Furthermore, the Burtons cannot execute under section
25-1-15(2) because the property is not in the hands of the
allegedly fraudulent transferee.26 When the Burtons executed
on the property, the land was no longer in the hands of Tonya
Wood, the allegedly fraudulent transferee, but was owned by
Baldwin. Because the conveyance has not been declared fraudulent
and is not in the hands of the fraudulent transferee, section
25-1-15 does not apply.
In sum, since the conveyance is not void, but merely
voidable, the Burtons could not simply disregard it and execute
24

Section 25-1-15 (1953) (repealed 1988) states in relevant

part:
Where a conveyance or obligation is
fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor,
when his claim has matured, may as against
any person, except a purchaser for fair
consideration without knowledge of the fraud
at the time of the purchase or one who has
derived title immediately or mediately from
such a purchaser:
(2) Disregard the conveyance, and
attach, or levy execution upon, the property
conveyed.
25

See Butler, 740 P.2d at 1262 n.13.

26

See id. at 1262 (ff[T]he remedy [of disregarding a
conveyance] is not available . . . when the property has been
transferred from a fraudulent transferee to a third-party
purchaser . . . . " ) .
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on the property. Contrary to the Burtons' position, Willard W&od
held no interest in the property at the time the Burtons obtained
their judgment against him; hence, a lien did not attach and tl^e
Burtons could not execute on the property.27 We therefore
conclude, as did the trial court, that it was necessary for th^
Burtons to bring a prior, separate action to set aside and
declare void the allegedly fraudulent conveyance before
foreclosing and executing on Baldwin's interest in the
property«

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The trial court concluded that the Burtons did not
bring a separate action to set the conveyance aside or assert
fraud anywhere in their pleadings. As a result, it held that the
statute of limitations had run on bringing an action for a
fraudulent conveyance and, therefore, as a matter of law, Willard
Wood had no ownership interest in the property in question. The
Burtons challenge the trial court's conclusion,
The applicable period of limitations is found in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3), which states in relevant part:
Within three years:

(3) An action for relief on the ground
of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of
action in such case does not accrue until the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake*
We first determine when the three-year period of
limitations began to accrue. In cases such as this, equity
requires that the statute of limitations for fraud does not begin

27

See Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) (judgment creditor cannot place lien against property of
judgment debtor's grantee).
28

See, e.g., Dahnken, Inc. of Salt Lake City v. Wilmarth,
726 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986) (judgment creditors brought action to
have assignment of real estate contract declared a fraudulent
conveyance and therefore void); Furniture Mfrs. Sales, Inc. v.
Deamer, 680 P.2d 398 (Utah 1984) (creditor brought action to s3t
aside allegedly fraudulent conveyance from debtor to-debtor's
wife)•
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to run until the fraud is discovered by the injured party. 29
Baldwin argues that the Burtons were on constructive notice of
the allegedly fraudulent conveyance and that the three-year
period began to run on any one of three different dates: in May
1980, when the deed from Willard Wood to his wife was recorded;
in June 1981, when Max Burton, Sr., obtained the judgment against
Willard Wood; or in September 1981, when the deed from Tonya Wood
to the Baldwins was recorded. The Burtons contend that
constructive knowledge of a transfer or the recording of a deed
itself is not enough to constitute notice of fraud. They rely on
Smith v. Edwards.3or where this court stated, ff%Mere
constructive notice of the deed by reason of its being filed for
record is not notice of the facts constituting the fraud.'" 31
Recording a deed or entering judgment alone is not enough in some
instances to apprise a party of the fraudulent nature of a
conveyance. However, the Burtons fail to reveal that Smith also
provides direction for determining what constitutes discovery of
fraud:
To ascertain what constitutes "a
discovery of the facts constituting the
fraud," reference must be had to the
principles of equity. Hence, in actions in
equity, the rule was that the means of
knowledge were equivalent to actual
knowledge; that is, that a knowledge of facts
which would have put an ordinarily prudent
man upon inquiry which, if followed up, would
have resulted in a discovery of the fraud,
was equivalent to actual discovery.32
The words "until the discovery [of fraud]11 are
generally interpreted as meaning from the time the fraud was
actually known or could have been discovered through the exercise
of reasonable diligence. 33 Specifically addressing section
78-12-26(3), this court stated that the three-year statute of
^ Esoonda v. Oaden State Bank, 283 P. 729, 731 (Utah 1929);
see also Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 39 (10th Cir.
1971) (applying Utah law).
30

17 P.2d 264 (Utah 1932).

31

Id. at 270 (quoting Duxburv v. Boice, 72 N.W. 838, 839
(Minn. 1897)).
32

IdL (citing Duxburv, 72 N.W. at 839).

33

See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Trout, 701 P.2d 851,
854 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Coronado Dev. Corp. v. Superior Court,
678 P.2d 535, 537 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Mason v. Laramie Rivers
Co., 490 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Wyo. 1971).
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limitations for fraud "begins to run from the time the person
entitled to the property knows, or by reasonable diligence and
inquiry should know, the relevant facts"34 of the fraud
perpetrated against him. Furthermore, we have previously
observed: "The means of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge* A
party who has opportunity of knowing the facts constituting thte
alleged fraud cannot be inactive and afterwards allege a want pf
knowledge that arose by reason of his own laches and
negligence."35
In Mason v. Laramie Rivers Co., shareholders sought to
challenge the issuance of stock on the ground that it was
fraudulent. The stock was issued in February 1963, and the
plaintiffs filed their action in July 1969. The Mason court
found that the plaintiffs as stockholders had voted either
personally or by proxy for the issuance of the stock at the
February 1963 meeting. The stockholders had failed to examine
the corporate records and had "xbeen negligent and careless of
their own interests.'"36 The means of knowledge were open to
the plaintiffs, and in the exercise of reasonable diligence, they
would have discovered the alleged fraud.37 Mason held that the
plaintiffs' action was therefore time barred by the four-year
statute of limitations for fraud actions,38
The Burtons argue that the alleged fraud took place
when Willard Wood conveyed his interest in the property to his
wife. It is conceivable that the Burtons could have discovered
the fraud as early as May 1980, when the Wood-to-Wood deed was
recorded. It is, however, more likely that the Burtons could
have, or at least through the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have, discovered the alleged fraud when the judgment
against Willard Wood was obtained in June 1981.
In Greco v. Pullara,39 a creditor brought an action
to set aside a deed of trust as a fraudulent conveyance. Greccft

^

Auerbach v. Samuels, 349 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Utah 1960).

35

Taylor v. Moore, 51 P.2d 222, 229 (Utah 1935) (citation
omitted).
36

Mason, 490 P.2d at 1064-65 (quoting Davis v. Harrison,
167 P.2d 1015, 1024 (Wash. 1946)).
37

Id. at 1065.

38

Id.
444 P.2d 383 (Colo. 1968).

No. 900339

12

dealt with a statute similar to section 78-12-26(3)40 and
reasoned that the limitations period "begins to run when the
defrauded person has knowledge of facts which in the exercise of
proper prudence and diligence would enable him to discover the
fraud."41 The court held that the creditor was chargeable with
constructive notice of the allegedly fraudulent conveyance at the
time she became a judgment creditor and the statute of
limitations began to run from the date of the judgment,42
Inasmuch as the Burtons were attempting to execute on a
judgment lien and the purpose of a judgment lien is to provide a
judgment creditor a way to obtain satisfaction of a judgment, it
logically follows that after obtaining the judgment against
Willard Wood, the Burtons should have searched for property upon
which to levy. Nothing in the record suggests that a search was
performed in 1981 when the Burtons obtained their judgment
against Willard Wood. Had a search been made, exercising
reasonable diligence and proper prudence, it surely would have
uncovered the transfer from Wood to his wife. Discovery of the
transfer would then have sparked further inquiry on the part of
the Burtons.43 If such inquiry had been pursued, the Burtons
would have discovered facts surrounding the allegedly fraudulent
conveyance. At the very least, discovery of the transfer should
have incited suspicion of fraud. The Burtons may not have
learned every detail of the alleged fraud or even discovered that
actual fraud did in fact occur. However, it is not necessary for
a claimant to know every fact about his fraud claim before the
statute begins to run.
The means of knowledge were available
to the Burtons, and upon obtaining the judgment against Willard
Wood, they should have discovered facts surrounding the alleged
fraud. Accordingly, the three-year limitation period imposed by
section 78-12-26(3) began to run when the Burtons' judgment
against Willard Wood was docketed. Consequently, the Burtons'
claim to set aside the conveyance is time-barred.

40

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 87-1-10 (1963) provides, "Bills for
relief on the ground of fraud, shall be filed within three years
after the discovery by the aggrieved party, of the facts
constituting such fraud, and not afterwards."
41

Greco, 444 P.2d at 384 (citations omitted).

42

Id.

43

A party is required to make inquiry if his findings would
prompt further investigation. See Diversified Equities v.
American Sav. & Loan, 739 P.2d 1133, 1137 n.5 (Utah Ct. App.
1987), cert, dismissed, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989).
44

See Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59, 68
(1975) .
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BONA FIDE PURCHASER
Implicit in the trial court's findings is that when the
Baldwins purchased the property from Tonya Wood, they took the[
property as bona fide purchasers. A bona fide purchaser is one
who pays valuable consideration for a conveyance, acts in good
faith, and takes without notice of an adverse claim or others'
outstanding rights to the seller's title.45 Therefore, under
the Act, even if the conveyance from Wood to his wife was
fraudulent, Baldwin's interest as a bona fide purchaser is not
affected by the Burtons' execution on the property.46
The Burtons argue that the Baldwins were not bona fi|de
purchasers when they purchased the property from Tonya Wood
because the Baldwins had notice of the judgment lien against
Willard Wood. The judgment lien therefore created an adverse
interest in the property. The Burtons assert that the Baldwinls
had actual notice of the judgment lien by virtue of a title
report issued by the Baldwins' title agent. There is no evidence
in the title report that would give the Baldwins notice of the
judgment lien against Willard Wood. More importantly, we have
already determined that the conveyance was voidable, and at th£
time the Burtons obtained their judgment against Willard Wood,
Wood held no interest in the property. Thus, the lien could not
attach. When the Baldwins purchased the property from Tonya
Wood, she was the only owner of record. While there was a
judgment against Willard Wood, no liens of record existed agaihst
the Baldwins' immediate grantor, Tonya Wood. As a result, the
Baldwins did not discover any judgment liens on the property and
therefore had no notice of any adverse interest in the property.
In the alternative, the Burtons contend that the
Baldwins had constructive notice of the fraudulent nature of tfce
conveyance from Tonya Wood to the Baldwins. The Burtons base
their contention on the fact that the 1980 conveyance was of
record and Willard Wood later signed the warranty deed that
conveyed the property to the Baldwins. According to the Burtons,
^ See Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 644, 648 (Utah 1954);
Peterson v. Peterson, 190 P.2d 135, 138 (Utah 1948); J.C Equifl.,
Inc. v. Sky Aviation, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973); Glaser v. Holdorf, 352 P.2d 212, 215 (Wash. 1960).
46

Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-13 states:
Bona fide purchasers not affected. The
provisions of this chapter shall not be
construed to affect or impair the title of a
purchaser for a valuable consideration,
unless it appears that such purchaser had
previous notice of the fraudulent intent of
his immediate grantor, or of the fraud
rendering void the title of such grantor.
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this was enough to extend notice to the Baldwins of the
possibility of fraud in the conveyance and to cause the Baldwins
to question Tonya Wood's ability to reconvey the property.
We disagree. In accordance with the above discussion,
the conveyance has not been determined to be fraudulent and was
therefore valid. Upon purchasing the property, the Baldwins had
no reason to believe otherwise. Accordingly, at the time of the
purchase, Tonya Wood was the only owner of record. The fact that
Willard Wood signed the warranty deed conveying the property to
the Baldwins does not affect Tonya Wood's title to the property,
nor does it put the Baldwins on notice to inquire further into
Willard Wood's interest in the property.47
In conclusion, we hold, in accordance with the
requirements of section 25-1-13, that the Baldwins took the
property without "notice of the fraudulent intent of [their]
immediate grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of
such grantor," and were therefore bona fide purchasers. Because
the Baldwins were bona fide purchasers, the Burtons were further
precluded from executing on the Baldwins' interest in the
property.
ATTORNEY FEES
Subsequent to the entry of summary judgment, Baldwin
submitted an affidavit of attorney fees, setting forth a detailed
summary of costs. She requested $12,715.25 in attorney fees and
costs, 8 and the Burtons objected. Following a hearing, the
trial court entered judgment in favor of Baldwin, requiring the
Burtons to pay $7,872.66 in attorney fees and related damages.
The Burtons appeal, arguing that the award of attorney fees was
improper because the trial court did not indicate a legal basis
for its conclusion.

47

A duty of inquiry requires a party to investigate and
diligently do what his or her findings would reasonably prompt.
The title search performed by the Baldwins showed Tonya Wood as
the only titled owner of record. It is not reasonable to think
that such a finding would prompt them to inquire further. See
Diversified Equities, 739 P.2d at 1137 & n.5 (purchasers who
reasonable relied on title search did not need to make further
inquiry).
48

Baldwin requested $3,192 in attorney fees, $328.06 in
secretarial fees, and $9,195.19 in paralegal costs.
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When reviewing an award of attorney fees, we will
affirm the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of
discretion. 49 The general rule is that an award of attorney
fees is appropriate only if authorized by statute or
contract. ° We note a statutory basis for the award of
attorney fees under Utah Code Ann<> § 78-27-56. Section
78-27-56(1) provides in part that "the court shall award
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." We begin our
analysis by addressing whether an award of attorney fees under
section 78-27-56 was appropriate in this case and continue by
addressing whether the amount of attorney fees awarded by the
trial court was reasonable.
For a party to be entitled to attorney fees under
section 78-27-56, the trial court must determine that a claim ils
"without merit" and that the party's conduct in bringing the su|it
"was lacking in good faith." 51 In Cady, we defined both of
these elements, stating that "without merit" means "frivolous" or
"having no basis in law or fact." 52 For purposes of section
78-27-56, we found the terms "lack of good faith" and "bad faith"
to be synonymous. 53 To establish bad faith, one or more of the
following must be lacking: " M l ) A n honest belief in the
propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to take
unconscionable advantage of others; (3) no intent to, or
knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will, [sijs]
hinder, delay or defraud others.'" 54
The Burtons' 198 6 execution on Baldwin's property
compelled her to bring this action. The Burtons claim that their
execution on Baldwin's property was neither without merit nor
brought in bad faith. They contend that after learning of the
scheduled foreclosure on the property, they proceeded to execute
on the property as would any reasonable creditor under the
49

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah
1988) (citing Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc.,
645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982)).
50

Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988; Golden Key Realty,
Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985); Turtle Management^,
Inc., 645 P.2d at 671.
51 Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983)
52 Id.
53 Id. at 151-52.
54

Id. at 151 (quoting Tacoma Assoc, of Credit Men v.
Lester, 433 P.2d 901, 904 (Wash. 1967)).
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circumstances. However, the record supports the trial court's
findings that there was no factual or legal justification for the
Burtons7 actions. At the time the Burtons obtained their
judgment, Willard Wood held no interest in the property. The
Burtons' only lien rights in this matter were against the
judgment debtor, Wood. Furthermore, contrary to the Burtons'
assertion, when the Baldwins took the property from Tonya Wood,
they were in no way successors in interest to Willard Wood and
they were not subject to liability on the Burtons' judgment
against Willard Wood. The Burtons were in error both factually
and legally when they executed on the interest of Baldwin, the
owner of the property.
Additionally, the Burtons exhibited a lack of good
faith. The writ of execution appeared to be correct on its face
in that it directed the sheriff to levy upon and sell Willard
Wood's unexempt real property to satisfy the Burtons' judgment.
However, the Burtons then issued a praecipe directing the sheriff
to levy on the "right, title, and interest of Gregory Baldwin and
Lynda Baldwin, successors in interest of Willard D. Wood." From
that point forward, all subsequent documents leading up to the
sale of the property were in error. The Baldwins were not
successors in interest of Willard Wood and should never have been
included in the execution proceedings. Had the Burtons proceeded
with an honest belief in the propriety of their activities, they
would have sought first to have the Wood-to-Wood conveyance set
aside as fraudulent before attempting to wrongfully execute on
Baldwin's interest in the property. Accordingly, we hold that
Baldwin is entitled to an award of attorney fees under section
78-27-56.
In regard to the reasonableness of the amount of
attorney fees awarded by the trial court, calculation of such
fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court.55
However, the trial court's award of attorney fees must be based
on and supported by evidence in the record.56 This court has
developed factors for trial courts to consider when evaluating
evidence to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee.57
Those factors include but are not limited to the extent of
services rendered, the difficulty of issues involved, the
reasonableness of time spent on the case, fees charged in the
locality for similar services, and the necessity of bringing an
55

Jenkins v. Bailev. 676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1984).

56

Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988; Jenkins, 676 P.2d at

393.
57

See Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 989; Travner v.
Cushina, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984); Jenkins, 676 P.2d at 393;
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1983); Wallace v.
Build. Inc., 402 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 1965).
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action to vindicate rights. 58 In light of these factors, the
attorney fee award appears to be reasonable. The evidence in the
record supports the award, as does the fact that the trial court,
in its discretion, substantially reduced the amount requested py
Baldwin.
The Burtons also argue that even if we find that the
trial court's award of attorney fees was proper, Baldwin is not
entitled to recover paralegal costs * While the trial court dip
not specifically delineate any portion of the $7,872.66 as
paralegal costs, the Burtons concluded that because only $3,192
of the total amount requested by Baldwin was for attorney feesL
the remaining $4,680.66 must have been for paralegal costs. The
Burtons contend that paralegal costs are not recoverable under
Utah law and that cases which have found the award of paralegal
fees to be appropriate involve instances where the paralegal
performed under the direction and supervision of an attorney.5*
According to the Burtons, Paul Richins, an independent paralegal
used by Baldwin's attorney, operated outside the attorney's
control when he prepared a billing statement separate from the
attorney's.
Simple arithmetic shows that at least some portion of
the $7,872.66 awarded by the trial court was for paralegal costs.
This court has never specifically addressed the issue of whether
paralegal fees are recoverable as part of an award of attorney
fees. We do so now with regard to the facts of this case.
In Continental Townhouses East Unit One Ass'n v.
Brockbank, 6Q the Arizona Court of Appeals considered the issue
of whether the value of legal work performed by legal
assistants 61 could be considered as an element of attorney
fees. 62 The plaintiffs' request for attorney fees included an
itemization of hourly rates and time spent for both attorneys &nd
legal assistants. Recognizing that the use of legal assistants
has become an increasingly essential element of legal services
provided by many law offices, the court ultimately held that
services provided by legal assistants "may properly be included
58

See Travner, 688 P.2d at 858; Cabrera, 694 P.2d at 625;
Wallace, 402 P.2d at 701.
59

See, e.g., Multi-moto v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 806
S.W.2d 560, 570 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
60

733 P.2d 1120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).

61

The Brockbank court used the terms legal assistant,
paralegal, and law clerk interchangeably in its opinion. Id. ^t
1128 n.9.
62

Id. at 1126.
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as elements in attorney fees applications and awards," 63 The
rationale of the court was that allowing recovery for legal
assistant fees promotes lawyer efficiency and decreases client
litigation costs because a lawyer's time is free from tasks a
legal assistant can perform at a lower rate- 64 The Brockbank
court further noted that services performed by legal assistants
are properly considered a component of attorney fees and are not
automatically included in a lawyer's hourly billing rate as part
of standard law office operating expenses but are often itemized
and billed separately,65
Applying the reasoning of Brockbank to the facts of
this case, it is clear that had Baldwin's attorney not retained
Richins to perform services traditionally performed by legal
assistants, the attorney would have had to perform these services
himself at a presumably higher billing rate- Taking into account
the trial court's substantial reduction in the amount requested,
especially in the area of paralegal costs, and having concluded
that the total award of attorney fees was reasonable, we find
that it was proper for the trial court to include services
provided by the paralegal in its award of attorney fees.
In short, this court finds that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding Baldwin reasonable attorney
fees. We therefore do not disturb the trial court's ruling.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
While not an issue raised on appeal, we deem it
appropriate to address a peripheral matter brought to our
attention during oral argument- As noted above, Paul Richins
assisted Baldwin's attorney as a paralegal. After judgment was
entered in favor of Baldwin, Richins took assignment of the
judgment. Richins then appeared pro se before this court,
arguing in favor of Baldwin's position to uphold the trial
court's rulings. While Richins is free to take assignment of the
judgment and appear on his own behalf to represent his interests
in the matter, such a practice gives rise to at least the
appearance of practicing law without a license.
Rule 5.5 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
prohibits lawyers from engaging in or assisting others in
activities that constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
While this might very well be an isolated incident, we are
concerned that it might have the far-reaching effect of inspiring
other members of the bar to similarly assign judgments to lay
Id. at 1127.
64

Id.
Id. at 1127-28.
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persons. In light of what is easily avoidable, we exhort all
members of the bar to refrain from entering into such
arrangements.

WE CONCUR:

Richard C, Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
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